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When "It Depends" Isn't Good Enough: The Problems Caused
by the Supreme Court of North Carolina's Decision in State v.
Mbacke*
INTRODUCTION
If legal academia were ever said to have an inside joke, it would
perhaps be the habit of responding to difficult or unanswerable
questions with a smirk and an evasive "It depends." In its proper
context, the response "It depends" is meant to convey the idea that a
solution might be fact-dependent and is followed by a barrage of
examples of situations that might yield a different result. Used
humorously, the phrase is another way of saying that the answerer
does not know or simply does not want to respond.
In State v. Mbacke,' the Supreme Court of North Carolina did
not seem to be in on the joke. This case was the court's first attempt
to interpret and apply Arizona v. Gant,2 a 2009 decision from the
United States Supreme Court that both law enforcement officers and
defense and civil liberties groups around the country viewed as a "big
deal."3 The state court was tasked with deciding whether, after a
vehicle's occupant has been arrested, it is "reasonable to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest."' Of course, it
depends. On what, however, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
effectively refused to answer. This Recent Development explores two
diverging interpretations of Gant's novel (and substantially
undeveloped) "reasonable to believe" standard, in which courts have
split over whether the reasonableness of a law enforcement officer's
belief that a vehicle "contains evidence of the offense of arrest"'
should be decided with respect to "the offense, by its nature"' or the
"circumstances of each case."' It then examines the Supreme Court of
North Carolina's failure to clearly rule on the issue and the
* @ 2013 Rebecca A. Fiss.
1. 365 N.C. 403,721 S.E.2d 218 (2012).
2. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
3. Barbara E. Armacost, Arizona v. Gant: Does It Matter?, 2009 SuP. Cr. REv. 275,
277.
4. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
5. Id.
6. Mbacke, 365 N.C. at 410,721 S.E.2d at 222.
7. Id. at 411, 721 S.E.2d at 223.
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consequences of such a failure.' As lower courts struggle to apply the
Mbacke holding in the future, the state of North Carolina risks sliding
back into a pre-Gant era of "exploratory searches"' and "police
entitlement"" of the sort that the United States Supreme Court
meant to avoid.
Analysis proceeds in four parts. Part I presents the basic legal
backdrop of Gant and introduces the competing interpretations of the
Court's controversial new rule. Part II reviews the facts and holding
of Mbacke and establishes the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
failure to effectively clarify Gant. Part III articulates two reasons for
the failure: first, that the court's decision reflects its general hostility
toward criminal defendants," and second, that the Gant holding is
problematically ambiguous. Part III then explores the likely
consequences of the court's refusal to state a rule-namely, that it will
8. While this Recent Development focuses on the particular question of which
factors should be considered when deciding whether it was "reasonable to believe" that
evidence would be found in a vehicle, the precise meaning of "reasonable to believe" is
itself the topic of considerable debate. See, e.g., Orin Kerr, When Is It "Reasonable to
Believe" that Evidence Relevant to an Offense is In a Car? Does That Require Probable
Cause, Reasonable Suspicion, or Something Else?, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 22, 2009,
11:51 PM), http://www.volokh.com/posts/1240453456.shtml. This issue, while important, is
beyond the scope of this Recent Development.
9. United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1999) (Trott, J.,
concurring) ("Unfortunately, in our search for clarity, we have now abandoned our
constitutional moorings and floated to a place where the law approves of purely
exploratory searches of vehicles during which officers with no definite objective or reason
for the search are allowed to rummage around in a car to see what they might find."); see
also Armacost, supra note 3, at 284 (noting that, in the pre-Gant era, "police could
conduct a search incident to arrest of the person regardless of whether the arrest was for a
traffic offense or some other crime[,] ... even if there was no reason to believe that
evidence of the crime of arrest would be found in the vehicle").
10. Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 624 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
11. Cf Constance E. Widenhouse, What's the Purpose? Making Sense of Rule 404(b)
1 (May 13, 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.ncids.org/Defender%20Training/
2011SpringConference/MakingSenseRule404(B).pdf. ("On the whole, [North Carolina]
courts have become increasingly uninterested, if not hostile, when criminal defendants
challenge admission of 'other crimes or wrongs' evidence under Rule 404."). A degree of
hostility toward criminal defendants is common in state tribunals where judges are elected.
See Thomas M. Ross, Article, Rights at the Ballot Box: The Effect of Judicial Elections on
Judges' Ability to Protect Criminal Defendants' Rights, 7 LAW & INEQ. 107, 107 (1988)
("This duty to protect [the rights of criminal defendants] can be difficult to perform when
state judges may be voted out of office. The difficulty arises because the public reacts
strongly toward criminal defendants. The public is typically hostile toward them."); Joanna
Cohn Weiss, Note, Tough on Crime: How Campaigns for State Judiciary Violate Criminal
Defendants' Due Process Rights, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1110-11 (2006) (arguing that
"judges who wish to be reelected might give defendants harsher sentences than they would
in a world without continual scrutiny by the electorate"); id. at 1109-12 (citing studies that
support this proposition). The justices of the Supreme Court of North Carolina are elected
by popular vote. See N.C. CONST. art. IV, § 16.
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allow lower courts to adopt their own standards based on hostility
toward criminal defendants and will leave law enforcement officers
without guidance on when vehicular searches incident to arrest are
permissible. Part IV examines the advantages and disadvantages of
the "nature-of-the-offense" and "circumstances-of-each-case"
standards and recommends that the state supreme court adopt a
narrow interpretation of the nature-of-the-offense rule, allowing
vehicular search incident to arrest only for a short list of offenses.12
I. MBACKE'S FAMILY TREE: BACKGROUND AND COMPETING
INTERPRETATIONS OF ARIZONA v. GANT
Before deciding Gant, the United States Supreme Court ruled on
two other important cases defining Fourth Amendment search and
seizure jurisprudence. In 1969, the Court decided Chimel v.
California," in which police searched a defendant's home after
arresting him for burglary.14 The Supreme Court held that there was
"ample justification" for a rule allowing a search of the arrestee's
person and the area "within his immediate control" -that is, "the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence" 16-but that for searches beyond this, "no
comparable justification" existed." How Chimel applied to
automobile searches incident to the custodial arrest of their
occupants, however, was unclear,'" and so the Supreme Court
attempted to create a "single, familiar standard" for this situation." It
held in New York v. Belton" that "when a policeman has made a
lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a
contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger
compartment of that automobile," including any containers, whether
or not they could possibly hold weapons or evidence.2' Despite
12. While this Recent Development focuses on the actions the Supreme Court of
North Carolina should take, the North Carolina General Assembly would be perhaps even
better situated to develop such a list, given that the supreme court can only rule on
offenses as they come before it.
13. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
14. Id. at 753.
15. Id. at 763 (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. The Supreme Court described state courts' attempts to apply the Chimel rule to
this context as being in "disarray." New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,459 n.1 (1981).
19. Id. at 458 (quoting Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200,213 (1979)).
20. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
21. Id. at 460.
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considerable criticism of the decision, 22 many courts opted to
interpret the holding literally, allowing vehicle searches even where
defendants had been arrested for such offenses as traffic violations or
had been secured prior to the search.23
Twenty-eight years after the Belton decision, the Supreme Court
was finally forced to face the criticisms of its previous holding.24
Rodney Gant was arrested for driving with a suspended license and
secured in the back of a patrol vehicle before police searched his car
and found evidence of narcotics possession.25 Holding the search
unlawful, the Supreme Court expressly rejected broad readings of
Belton2 6 and parted from its Chimel precedent,27 establishing instead a
two-pronged test: police may search a vehicle incident to its
occupant's arrest only if (1) "the arrestee is within reaching distance
of the passenger compartment at the time of the search" or (2) "it is
reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of
arrest." 28
While the first prong of the Gant test is much more easily
traceable to earlier Fourth Amendment case law,29 the second prong
has a weak pedigree."o The Court acknowledged that the new
standard "does not follow from Chimel,"31 and instead cited to a
concurrence by Justice Scalia in Thornton v. United States3 2 as the
22. See, e.g., Myron Moskovitz, A Rule in Search of a Reason: An Empirical
Reexamination of Chimel and Belton, 2002 Wis. L. REV. 657, 676-77 (finding that the
Belton Court's premises in reaching their conclusions were inconsistent with what police
officers actually do in the field); John F. Sheehan, State v. Pierce: State Constitutional
Protection Against the Belton Search Incident to Arrest Rule, 30 NEW ENG. L. REv. 843,
851-62 (1996) (documenting numerous jurisdictions in which state courts have
marginalized Belton's effect).
23. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671, 675-76 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
24. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009).
25. Id. at 336.
26. See id. at 343 ("To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every
recent occupant's arrest would thus untether the rule from the justifications underlying the
Chimel exception-a result clearly incompatible with our statement in Belton that it 'in no
way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic
scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.' " (quoting Belton, 453 U.S. at 460
n.3)).
27. See id. (acknowledging that its holding "does not follow from Chimel").
28. Id. at 351.
29. The Court explained that it had looked to Belton, which allowed officers to search
the passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to arrest, and Chimel, which allowed
police to search only the arrestee's "immediate control" or reaching distance and provided
the rationale for Belton. See id. at 335.
30. Accordingly, and because State v. Mbacke interpreted the second prong of the
Gant standard, this Recent Development focuses solely on the second prong.
31. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343.
32. 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
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authority for its new rule." Furthermore, the Court did little to
explain the second prong, stating merely that arrest for a traffic
violation would not suffice to provide a reasonable basis for a
vehicular search incident to arrest, but that in Belton and Thornton
(cases in which the defendants were arrested for drug offenses), "the
offense of arrest will supply a basis for searching the passenger
compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein.""
"The Supreme Court's reticence [in explaining the meaning of its
new standard] has led to confusion" among state and lower federal
courts. 5 Courts attempting to answer the question of when it is
"reasonable to believe [a] vehicle contains evidence of the offense of
arrest" 6 have generally taken one of two approaches: either the issue
should be decided on a case-by-case basis (the "circumstances-of-
each-case" or "COEC" test), or the answer must be found in the
nature of the offense of arrest, regardless of external circumstances
(the "nature-of-the-offense" or "NOTO" test).
A number of courts have held, either implicitly or explicitly, that
the reasonableness of a vehicular search for evidence relevant to the
offense of arrest should be decided by the circumstances of each case.
In United States v. Reagan, for example, the district court relied on
the Sixth Circuit's previous interpretation of "reasonable belief"38 to
conclude that the second prong of Gant permitted a vehicular search
incident to arrest when common sense and the totality of the
circumstances made it reasonable to believe that evidence of the
offense of arrest would be found within.3 9 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals, meanwhile, drew directly from its precedents in the
stop-and-frisk context,40 holding that "a police officer must be able to
point to specific and articulable facts" warranting intrusion in order to
meet the Gant standard; likewise, a reviewing court must "consider
the totality of the circumstances."" Important elements of the
33. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
34. Id. at 344.
35. United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724,728 (E.D. Tenn. 2010).
36. Gant, 556 U.S. at 351.
37. 713 F. Supp. 2d 724.
38. The Sixth Circuit had held that "an arrest warrant is sufficient to enter a residence
if the officers, by looking at common sense factors and evaluating the totality of the
circumstances, establish a reasonable belief that the subject of the arrest warrant is within
the residence at that time." United States v. Pruitt, 458 F.3d 477, 483 (6th Cir. 2006).
39. See Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 728.
40. These decisions draw from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
41. United States v. Taylor, 49 A.3d 818, 824 (D.C. 2012). The D.C. Court of Appeals
had previously applied this interpretation of the Gant rule, albeit without devoting as
[Vol. 911408
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"totality" that must be considered, the court insisted, include an
officer's knowledge of the "patterns of operation" of lawbreakers,
"common sense conclusions about human behavior, "42 and the
offense of arrest itself.43 Some courts are less explicit in their adoption
of the circumstances-of-each-case rule but nonetheless apply the same
reasoning.'
Other courts, meanwhile, have adopted a nature-of-the-offense
rule, whereby the offense of arrest alone, regardless of any
surrounding circumstances, determines the propriety of a search
incident to arrest. These courts have held, in other words, that an
arrest for certain types of crimes give officers a per se reasonable
belief that evidence of the crime may be found in the car, without
requiring consideration of any additional surrounding circumstances.
Courts using such an approach have found permissible searches
much attention to articulating the interpretation, in Dawkins v. United States, 987 A.2d 470
(D.C. 2010). In that case, the court concluded that,
having observed appellant lean into the car and close the door shortly before he
was seen with a marijuana blunt, the officers reasonably could have believed that
appellant had additional marijuana or drug paraphernalia in the car such that it
was "reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found
in the vehicle."
Id. at 476 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343).
42. Taylor, 49 A.3d at 825 (internal quotation marks omitted) (claiming as its source
of authority repeated decisions by "this court and the Supreme Court").
43. Id. ("Although we eschew a per se rule, we recognize that a court may not ignore
the offense of arrest in determining whether an evidentiary search of an automobile was
justified under Gant."). For another interesting example of a court considering the offense
of arrest as one circumstance in a totality, see United States v. Owen, No. 1:09cr38HSO-
JMR, 2009 WL 2857959 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 28, 2009). In Owen, the officer's offense report
listed the offense of arrest as "fugitive from justice/NCIC" and stated that the defendant
was a fugitive for "Fraud and Abuse." Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). The
court held that,
[biased on the totality of the evidence and the facts surrounding Defendant's
arrest in the present case, the arresting officer, after learning Defendant was a
fugitive in eight [8] different states on the basis of fraud, had reasonable grounds
to suspect that the vehicle contained evidence of the offense of arrest within the
meaning of Gant.
Id. Because the offense of arrest implicated the officer's knowledge of a number of other
crimes for which the defendant was already at large, the nature of the offense of arrest and
the totality of the circumstances in this case are uniquely synonymous.
44. For example, in People v. Livigni, No. 2007NA029663, 2009 WL 5174202 (N.Y.
Dist. Ct. Dec. 28, 2009), a New York district court explained that the same circumstances
which provided the officer with justification to arrest the defendant (namely, behavior
indicating that he was under the influence of drugs and the presence of a crack pipe on the
driver's floor mat) also provided the officer with a "reasonable basis to believe" that the
car contained further evidence. Id. at *7.
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incident to arrests based on driving under the influence 45 and gun
possession, 46 among others, and the Gant Court specifically provided
that drug possession would merit such a search.47 In Brown v. State,4 8
the defendant was arrested based on two outstanding warrants for
theft; after the officer had secured the defendant in the patrol vehicle,
the officer spotted a lady's wallet in the driver's seat, confirmed that it
belonged to someone other than the defendant, and searched the rest
of the vehicle. 49 Reading Gant as addressing the major criticisms of
the Belton rule but not overruling its holding, the Florida District
Court of Appeal adopted the NOTO test." Belton, the district court
emphasized, had made it clear that, provided an arrest had been
made lawfully based on probable cause, no additional justification
was needed for a search incident to the arrest.s' Adopting a case-by-
case analysis, the district court argued, would require assuming "that
our high Court intended to completely eviscerate Belton" (despite the
Supreme Court's failure to expressly overrule it) because such an
interpretation would turn the search incident to arrest exception into
a near duplication of the automobile exception.5 2 Other courts, in
adopting the NOTO rule, emphasize the original language in Gant,
which plainly states: "[T]he offense of arrest will supply a basis for
searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any
containers therein."" As with the circumstances-of-each-case
45. See, e.g., State v. Cantrell, 233 P.3d 178, 184 (Idaho 2010).
46. See, e.g., State v. Foy, 208 N.C. App. 562, 566, 703 S.E.2d 741,743 (2010).
47. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009). Note that what the Court actually
said was that "in other[] tcasesl, including Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will
supply a basis for searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any
containers therein." Id. But given that the defendants in both of those cases were arrested
after being found in possession of controlled substances, one can infer that the Court
believes drug possession will supply a basis for a search incident to arrest.
48. 24 So. 3d 671 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
49. Id. at 674.
50. See id at 679. For the principle holding of Belton, see supra notes 20-21 and
accompanying text.
51. See Brown, 24 So. 3d at 678.
52. Id. at 679. Under the automobile exception, officers may search a vehicle
completely and immediately, without waiting for a warrant to issue, if they have probable
cause to believe it contains contraband. 1 CRIMINAL PRACTICE MANUAL § 25:125 (2012).
This exception to the warrant requirement stems from the recognition that motor vehicles
are associated with a lesser expectation of privacy than dwellings. See, e.g., South Dakota
v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976) ("[L]ess rigorous warrant requirements govern
because the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less
than that relating to one's home or office.").
53. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009); see, e.g., State v. Cantrell, 233 P.3d 178,
184 (Idaho 2010). In Cantrell, the Supreme Court of Idaho rejected the defendant's
contention that officers must possess additional information suggesting that evidence
related to the offense of arrest-in this case, driving under the influence ("DUI")-might
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standard, some courts employing the nature-of-the-offense rule do so
implicitly.,,
The United States Supreme Court provided little guidance on
how to apply Gant's novel second prong, which "does not follow
from" its other case law on the subject." Consequentially, lower
courts have diverged on two essentially contradictory paths. Except to
the extent that a court adopting the COEC rule might acknowledge
that the nature of the offense is one of the circumstances that should
be taken into account,5 6 courts generally choose one standard or the
other. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
holding in Mbacke is so troubling.
II. STATE V. MBACKE: TRYING TO TAKE BOTH PATHS
A. Facts of the Case
In State v. Mbacke," Winston-Salem police responded to a call
that a man who had "shot up" the caller's house the night before was
once again parked in the caller's driveway." Officers arrived just as
be found in the vehicle. See id. ("Based upon [the defendant's] reasoning, DUI evidence
that is in plain view, or partially hidden, but visible to the officers, would supply a basis for
the search, whereas evidence that is carefully hidden would not. Such an inquiry would
turn on a perpetrator's ability to hide evidence. This type of analysis resonates more with
the plain view exception. This is not, however, what the search incident to arrest exception
contemplates or what Gant requires."). To this court, an arrest for DUI was sufficient to
make it "reasonable to believe" that evidence of the offense of arrest could be found in
the car. See id. Likewise, in People v. Notolli, 130 Cal. Rptr. 3d 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011),
the court echoed that the Gant Court allowed for making the "nature of the crime of
arrest ... determinative," and many times " 'the offense of arrest will supply a basis for
searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle and any containers therein'
while, in other cases, the offense of arrest would not provide any 'reasonable basis to
believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence. ' " Id. at 902 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at
344).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Brunick, 374 F. App'x 714, 716 (9th Cir. 2010). Although
the Ninth Circuit in Brunick did not explicitly state its adoption of the nature-of-the-
offense test, its reasoning unmistakably aligns with that standard. The court denied that
Gant allowed a vehicular search incident to the defendant's arrest for carrying a concealed
weapon on the basis that neither a receipt nor a knife sheaf, which the government
asserted might have been found, "would be probative of the offense for which Brunick
was arrested," since Oregon law does not require proof of ownership or encompass
weapons concealed within a vehicle. Id.
55. Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (acknowledging that its holding "does not follow from
Chimel").
56. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
57. Throughout this Recent Development, "Mbacke" refers to the case as decided by
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, as opposed to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals. Likewise, "the Mbacke court" refers to the Supreme Court of North Carolina
deciding this case.
58. State v. Mbacke, 365 N.C. 403,404, 721 S.E.2d 218,219 (2012).
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the defendant, Omar Sidy Mbacke, was backing out; the officers
blocked the defendant's car and demanded that he get out with his
hands in the air.59 Following a moment of hesitation, Mbacke exited
the vehicle, kicked the car door shut, and laid on the ground.60 After
Mbacke admitted that he had a gun tucked into his waistband,
officers arrested him for carrying a concealed weapon and secured
him in a patrol car." The officers then returned to the defendant's car
and opened the driver's side door, where they spotted a sizeable brick
of cocaine protruding from beneath the driver's seat. 62
Following his arrest, Mbacke was indicted on four charges, only
one of which was related to the crime of carrying a concealed gun for
which he was initially arrested. The other three charges-trafficking
in cocaine by possession, trafficking in cocaine by transportation, and
possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine'-all arose from the
police's discovery of drugs in Mbacke's vehicle following his arrest
and confinement in the patrol car. At trial, Mbacke moved to
suppress the cocaine, 65 arguing that the search of his vehicle following
his arrest violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable
searches and seizures.66 The trial court denied the motion, and
Mbacke was convicted of both the weapons charge and the three drug
charges.67
B. Mbacke at the Court of Appeals
When the case arrived at the North Carolina Court of Appeals, 8
however, Mbacke experienced a change of fortune. The court found
that the warrantless search of Mbacke's vehicle, after he had been
arrested for carrying a concealed weapon and secured in the back of a
patrol car, had in fact violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights. 9 The court of appeals reached this conclusion after
interpreting Gant as "requir[ing] an officer to suspect the presence of
59. Id. at 404, 721 S.E.2d at 219.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 404-05, 721 S.E.2d at 219.
62. Id. at 405, 721 S.E.2d at 219.
63. See id. at 404, 721 S.E.2d at 219.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 40344,721 S.E.2d at 219.
67. Id. at 405, 721 S.E.2d at 219-20. The defendant then moved for appropriate relief,
challenging the denial of his motion to suppress and seeking dismissal of the drug charges,
but the trial court stood by its decision. Id. at 406, 721 S.E.2d at 220.
68. State v. Mbacke, 209 N.C. App. 35, 703 S.E.2d 823 (2011), rev'd, 365 N.C. 403, 721
S.E.2d 218 (2012).
69. See id. at 45, 703 S.E.2d at 830.
1412 [Vol. 91
2013] PROBLEMS WITH STATE V. MBA CKE 1413
more direct evidence of the crime of arrest than the highly indirect
circumstantial evidence the State contends may be necessary to rebut
possible defenses" of good faith mistake, inadvertence, or duress.
Appearing to adopt a nature-of-the-offense approach, the court also
emphasized that it did not read Gant as authorizing law enforcement
officers to search vehicles for evidence to support additional
charges.72 In this case, the court explained, the evidence that the state
argued it might find in a search of the car-gun boxes, holsters,
ammunition, spent shell casings, additional indicia of ownership of
the firearm, or other weapons-would all be either (1) evidence of
separate offenses or (2) evidence unrelated to the offense of carrying
a weapon.
C. Mbacke at the Supreme Court
Despite the court of appeals's persuasive reasoning, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina reversed." The court, adopting language
from Terry v. Ohio," held that when "investigators have a reasonable
and articulable basis to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest
might be found in a suspect's vehicle after the occupants have been
removed and secured," they are permitted to search the vehicle. 6
70. Id. at 43, 703 S.E.2d at 829.
71. Although the court of appeals briefly alluded to the "highly fact-driven nature of
the analysis required under Gant," id. at 43, 703 S.E.2d at 829, it in fact said very little
about the extent to which the facts of the present case permitted inferences by law
enforcement officers. Instead, the court provided the statutory definition of "carrying a
concealed weapon," id. (noting it is unlawful for "'any person willfully and intentionally
to carry concealed about his person any pistol or gun except [when] ... [t]he person is on
the person's own premises'" (alterations in original) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-269(al) (2011)), and then reviewed the elements of the crime. See id. at 44, 703 S.E.2d
at 830. Reasoning that none of those elements would be supported by the evidence that
the state had argued might be present in the car, the court concluded: "As with the traffic
offenses discussed in Gant, we find it unreasonable to believe an officer will find in, or
even need to seek from, a defendant's vehicle further evidence of carrying a concealed
weapon when the officer has found the defendant" carrying a concealed weapon off of his
own premises. Id. at 45, 703 S.E.2d at 830. Given the court of appeals's heavy reliance on
the nature of carrying a concealed weapon and its lack of concern about the circumstances
of the arrest, the court seems to follow the NOTO rule.
72. See id. at 44, 703 S.E.2d at 829.
73. Id.
74. See State v. Mbacke, 365 N.C. 403,404, 721 S.E.2d 218, 219 (2012).
75. 392 U.S. 1 (1967).
76. Mbacke, 365 N.C. at 409-10, 721 S.E.2d at 222. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina adopted its "reasonable and articulable basis" language from Terry, a United
States Supreme Court case which examined the basis of suspicion necessary for an officer
to stop and frisk an individual. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text. Notably,
this language seems to be at odds with a nature-of-the-offense interpretation of Gant. See
infra note 147.
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Reasoning that the report of the defendant's behavior the night
before the arrest and his furtiveness in dealing with the police
supported a reasonable belief that evidence of the offense of arrest
could be found in the vehicle, 7 the court then concluded that the
investigators in this case satisfied the relevant standard and,
therefore, that Mbacke's Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated."
Despite having openly based its analysis on Gant, the Mbacke
court failed to adopt one of the two irreconcilable approaches as
other courts generally have done since the 2009 Supreme Court
decision." In short, the court set forth a "reasonable and articulable
basis"" rule governing the reasonableness of a belief that a vehicle
"contains evidence of the offense of arrest"" but declined to establish
a reference point from which such reasonableness could be decided.
Instead, the court explained that the reasonableness of a vehicular
search would "ordinarily" be determined by the nature of the
offense8 2 and yet that "the circumstances of each case" would also
"ordinarily" answer the same question. This conflation of the two
rules is, at worst, an outright contradiction; at best, it creates a
confusing standard that provides no practical guidance to lower
courts and law enforcement officers.
77. See Mbacke, 365 N.C. at 410, 721 S.E.2d at 222.
78. Id. at 404, 721 S.E.2d at 219.
79. See supra Part I.
80. Mbacke, 365 N.C. at 409, 721 S.E.2d at 222.
81. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
82. The majority opinion in Mbacke initially stated that its "holding is consistent with
the results reached by other courts," 365 N.C. at 410, 721 S.E.2d at 222, explaining that
[iun general, courts examining an offense involving weapons have inferred that the
offense, by its nature, ordinarily makes it reasonable to believe the defendant's car
will contain evidence of that offense, so that searching a defendant's car incident
to an arrest for a weapons offense is almost always consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.
Id. (emphasis added).
83. In the next paragraph following its comments in favor of the nature-of-the-offense
rule, the Mbacke court rather hurriedly asserted that it was
not holding that an arrest for carrying a concealed weapon is ipso facto an occasion
that justifies the search of a vehicle.... [T]he "reasonable to believe" standard
required by Gant will not routinely be based on the nature or type of the offense
of arrest and ... the circumstances of each case ordinarily will determine the
propriety of any vehicular searches conducted incident to an arrest.
Id. at 411, 721 S.E.2d at 223 (second emphasis added).
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III. WHY THE MBACKE COURT DID NOT CHOOSE AN APPROACH,
AND WHY THIS IS A PROBLEM
This Recent Development proposes two possible (though not
mutually exclusive) explanations for the Supreme Court of North
Carolina's reticence in selecting a standard. First, the court possibly
allowed its reasoning to be influenced by its general hostility toward
criminal defendants, combining two contradictory rules to reach a
desired result that it could not have reached comfortably under either
standard on its own. Second, the court's decision may have reflected
the difficulty in applying the Gant standard, which is also evident in
previous North Carolina jurisprudence interpreting Gant.
A. First Explanation: Conflating Two Standards in Response to
General Hostility Toward Criminal Defendants
The Mbacke court likely could not, at least without raising
serious doubts, have held that "it was reasonable for the arresting
officers to believe that they might find evidence of the offense of
arrest in defendant's vehicle"' under either the COEC or the NOTO
standard. Justice Timmons-Goodson made the case in her dissent
that, had the court depended on the actual circumstances of the
arrest, there would be no reason to believe that the vehicle contained
evidence relevant to the offense of carrying a concealed weapon.85
First, she explained, if the defendant were trying to hide something in
the moment that he lowered his hands toward his waist before
obeying police orders, "he would be trying to hide his weapon-the
weapon he relinquished to police"" 6-and so the gesture did not give
reason to believe that his vehicle contained evidence of carrying a
concealed gun." In contrast to many of the cases the State relied on,8
the officers in Mbacke discovered neither a weapon nor anything
indicating presence of a weapon in Mr. Mbacke's vehicle prior to his
84. Id. at 404, 721 S.E.2d at 219.
85. See id. at 412, 721 S.E.2d at 223 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting). The General
Statutes of North Carolina define the crime of "carrying a concealed weapon" as "any
person willfully and intentionally ... carry[ing] concealed about his person any pistol or
gun." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-269(al) (2011) (emphasis added).
86. Mbacke, 365 N.C. at 412, 721 S.E.2d at 224 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 412, 721 S.E.2d at 223-24.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Vinton, 594 F.3d 14, 18 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that
where officer spotted the first weapon laying in clear view on the back seat, there was
reason to believe that there may be more in the vehicle); State v. Foy, 208 N.C. App. 562,
562, 703 S.E.2d 741, 741 (2010) (holding that where initial entry was with the defendant's
consent and the revolver was in plain view inside the vehicle, officers had reason to believe
that additional evidence relating to the charge of possession of a firearm could be found in
the vehicle).
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arrest.8 9 To the contrary, the defendant's arrest was based solely on a
firearm that was found concealed on his person once he was outside
the vehicle.90 And while the defendant's decision to kick his door shut
after exiting his vehicle could arguably provoke some suspicion,
Justice Timmons-Goodson argued that relying on that action as an
indication that his vehicle contained evidence of the offense
"dangerously undermines the right to privacy."" Thus, it is unlikely
that the surrounding circumstances of the case could have supported
a reasonable belief that additional evidence could be found in the car.
Mbacke is even more difficult to justify under a nature-of-the-
offense approach. As the court of appeals pointed out, the Supreme
Court of North Carolina has articulated the elements of the crime of
carrying a concealed weapon to include the following: " '(1) The
accused must be off his own premises; (2) he must carry a deadly
weapon; (3) the weapon must be concealed about his person.' "92
Emphasizing that neither ownership nor use of the concealed weapon
was required,' the court of appeals correctly rejected contentions
that the officers could have reasonably believed that they would find
evidence in the vehicle pertaining to any of the crime's elements.9 4
89. See Brief for Defendant/Appellant at 24, Mbacke, 365 N.C. 403, 721 S.E.2d 218
(No. COAO9-1395), 2010 WL 451023, at *21.
90. See id. at 25.
91. Mbacke, 365 N.C. at 412, 721 S.E.2d at 224 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).
The dissenting justice emphasized that "[plrotecting one's privacy from police searches by
closing a vehicle door does not give rise to a reasonable belief to justify a warrantless
search." Id. On one hand, she explained, "[If defendant closes the vehicle door when
complying with an officer's order to exit the vehicle, then law enforcement, under today's
opinion, can search the car. On the other hand, if defendant leaves the door open, officers
can conduct a broader plain view search of the passenger compartment." Id. The language
in this passage echoes the Gant Court's argument that an expansive reading of earlier
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which would deem any vehicular search incident to
arrest reasonable on the grounds that an "expansive rule correctly balances law
enforcement interests ... with an arrestee's limited privacy interest in his vehicle[,J ...
seriously undervalues the privacy interests at stake." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344-
45 (2009). The contention, of course, raises a great many more issues concerning the right
to privacy. However, the allusion to privacy interests is an important element both of
Justice Timmons-Goodson's thought-provoking dissent and of Fourth Amendment
analysis as a whole.
92. State v. Mbacke, 209 N.C. App. 35, 44,703 S.E.2d 823,830 (2011) (quoting State v.
Williamson, 238 N.C. 652, 654, 78 S.E.2d 763, 765 (1953)), rev'd, 365 N.C. 403, 721 S.E.2d
218 (2012). The statutory prohibition of the crime can be found at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-269 (2011).
93. See Mbacke, 209 N.C. App. at 45,703 S.E.2d at 830.
94. See id. The majority opinion of the court of appeals explained that all of the
evidence that the State argued it might find in a search of the car-"other firearms, gun
boxes, holsters, ammunition, spent shell casings or other indicia of ownership of the
firearm"-would in reality be either (1) evidence of separate offenses or (2) evidence
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Based on the elements necessary to prove the crime of carrying a
concealed weapon, therefore, once the officers had the gun itself,
there could have been no evidence in the car that would be relevant
to proving the crime of arrest.
Additionally, the supreme court should not have held the search
to be reasonable even if evidence serving to rebut any possible
defenses to the crime of carrying a concealed weapon was likely to be
found. The State argued, and the court of appeals rejected the
argument, that the search was reasonable because it could reasonably
have been expected to yield evidence "to rebut claims by ...
[D]efendant of good faith mistake, inadvertence, duress or that he
was not aware he had placed the gun in the waist band of his
trousers."95 Both the defense and the court of appeals correctly
pointed out that "the defenses of a good faith mistake, duress, or
inadvertence could have also applied . . . in Gant, where, for example,
the defendant could have argued that he was driving without a license
while under circumstances of duress,"" and where the United States
Supreme Court flatly denied that a search incident to arrest was
reasonable." Thus, Gant arguably precludes the idea that a search is
reasonable solely because evidence relevant to rebut defenses against
the crime of arrest may be found in the car.
Given that Mbacke's drug convictions could not have been
upheld comfortably under either the COEC or the NOTO rule, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's decision to nonetheless do so
seems to reflect the general hostility toward criminal defendants that
is often characteristic of courts with popularly elected judges." Many
of the justices who presumably voted in the majority,99 including
unrelated to the offense of carrying a weapon. Id. at 43-44, 703 S.E.2d at 829; see also
United States v. Brunick, 374 F. App'x 714, 716 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that because the
defendant was arrested for carrying a concealed weapon, any evidence of the defendant's
ownership or possession of the gun that might be found in his vehicle was irrelevant).
95. Mbacke, 209 N.C. App. at 43, 703 S.E.2d at 829 (alterations in original) (quoting
Brief for the State at 15, Mbacke, 209 N.C. App. 35, 703 S.E.2d 823 (No. COAO9-1395),
2010 WL 530420, at *15).
96. Id.
97. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,351 (2009).
98. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
99. Although neither the court reporter nor the Supreme Court of North Carolina's
website records specific votes in favor of the opinion of the court, it would appear from
other recent opinions that the court's normal practice is to report nonparticipating justices,
dissenting justices, concurring justices, and those who joined dissents and concurrences,
while leaving those who joined the majority unnamed. See generally White v. Trew, -
N.C. -, 736 S.E.2d 166 (2013) (naming the author of the opinion of the court, a
nonparticipating justice, a dissenting justice, and a justice who joined in the dissent); State
v. Heien, _ N.C. -, 737 S.E.2d 351 (2012) (naming the author of the opinion of the court,
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Justice Edmunds (the opinion's author), ran for election on platforms
suggesting that they would be "tough on criminals,"'" a campaign
strategy which Justice Stevens of the United States Supreme Court
once opined was such " 'evidence of bias that [it] should disqualify a
[judicial] candidate from sitting in criminal cases.' "I0" Further, the
charges arising from the discovery of the cocaine in Mbacke's vehicle
were considered serious ones under North Carolina law, 102 and
allowing evidence to be suppressed as a penalty for officer
misconduct "often renders a case unprosecutable, thus benefiting the
criminal defendant while simultaneously failing to penalize the law-
breaking police officer."'0 3 Several external factors were therefore
present which may have influenced the court's decision to affirm
Mbacke's convictions.
a dissenting justice, and two justices who joined in the dissent); State v. Otto, _ N.C. ,
726 S.E.2d 824 (2012) (naming the author of the opinion of the court, a concurring justice,
and a justice who joined in the concurrence). Justice Timmons-Goodson is the only justice
listed as dissenting in Mbacke.
100. See ReelectEdmunds08, Reelect Justice Edmunds Official Commercial, YoUTUBE
(Oct. 17, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OGJPFdgtQ5s (showing an image of
criminals lined up for mug shots and telling the audience that "[t]hese people don't want
you to reelect Bob Edmunds to the Supreme Court" and to "[not] let them get the upper
hand"); see also judgebarbarajackson, Judge Barbara Jackson: True Conservative for
Supreme Court, YouTUBE (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=mOzKz.SmT-Y (calling then-Judge Jackson "tough in the courtroom");
thepeoplewhothink, Paul Newby for Supreme Court - "Banjo," YOUTUBE (Oct. 18, 2012),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BJoHuJ3KTB4 (asserting that Justice Paul Newby has
"got criminals on the run," that "he'll take them down one by one," and that "criminals
best beware"). While other justices' campaigns did not widely tout them as tough on
criminal defendants, some media sources described them as such. See, e.g., Jim Morrill,
Court's New Chief Known for Integrity, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, at 1B (Feb. 6, 2006)
(quoting former Justice Robert Orr, who noted that " 'you would find very few cases that
were close to the line where [Chief Justice Sarah Parker] favored criminal defendants' ").
101. Weiss, supra note 11, at 1102 (second alteration in original).
102. The brick that officers confiscated from Mbacke's car contained 993.8 grams of
cocaine. State v. Mbacke, 365 N.C. 403, 405, 721 S.E.2d 218, 219 (2012). Under North
Carolina law, transporting 400 grams of cocaine is enough to result in a fine of $250,000
and a prison term of up to 219 months (more than eighteen years). N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 90-95(h)(3)c. (2011). Had Mbacke been held criminally liable only for the concealed
weapons charge, he would have been free to roam the streets one month after starting his
sentence. See id. § 14-269(c) (noting a first-time concealed weapons offender is "guilty of a
Class 2 misdemeanor"); id. § 15A-1340.23(c) (noting that first-time offenders of Class 2
misdemeanors are eligible for up to thirty days in prison).
103. Carol A. Chase, Rampart: A Crying Need to Restore Police Accountability, 34
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 767, 767 (2000).
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B. Second Explanation: Gant's Ambiguity Leads to an Improper
Result
The other explanation for the state court's failure to rule clearly,
one that is more indicative of the serious shortcomings of the Gant
decision, is that the new second prong of the Supreme Court's rule is
truly difficult to interpret and apply. After all, "[t]he Supreme Court
has not expressly clarified the meaning of the phrase 'reasonable to
believe' as it is used in Gant, nor has it expounded on when it is
reasonable for a law enforcement officer to believe"" that a vehicle
contains evidence of the crime of arrest."as Accordingly, many courts,
not just the Supreme Court of North Carolina, have "struggled with
how to define its parameters." 106 Even within North Carolina, courts
have issued an erratic pattern of decisions, indicating that the state is
at a serious loss as to how to make sense of the new standard.
On December 21, 2010, exactly two weeks before the North
Carolina Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Mbacke, the court
reached the opposite conclusion in State v. Foy,"o another case
involving an arrest for illicit possession of a weapon. In Foy, a
defendant pulled over on suspicion of drunk driving gave an officer
permission to enter the defendant's truck to find his mobile phone. 0 s
While retrieving the phone, the officer spotted a revolver.1 09 He
subsequently arrested the defendant for carrying a concealed
weapono10 and then further searched the defendant's truck, where he
found open containers of alcohol, a rifle, marijuana, ammunition, and
other contraband."'
In Foy, the court of appeals agreed with the State's argument
that other concealed weapons, ammunition, a receipt, or a gun permit
would constitute evidence related to the offense of carrying a
104. United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724, 727 (E.D. Tenn. 2010).
105. Other sources have called the holding "a bit of an oddity[,] ... with very little
explanation." Jeff Welty, Arizona v. Gant and Searches Incident to Arrest, U.N.C. SCH.
Gov'T BLOG (Apr. 22, 2009, 8:43 AM), http://nceriminallaw.sog.unc.edu/?p=276.
106. Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Construction and Application of Supreme
Court's Holding in Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 173 L. Ed. 2d 485, 47 A.L.R. Fed. 2d
657 (2009), that Police May Search Vehicle Incident to Recent Occupant's Arrest Only If
Arrestee Is Within Reaching Distance of Passenger Compartment at Time of Search or It Is
Reasonable to Believe Vehicle Contains Evidence of Offense-Substantive Traffic Offenses,
55 A.L.R.6th 1, 1 (2010); see also supra notes 35-54 and accompanying text.
107. 208 N.C. App. 562, 703 S.E.2d 741 (2010).
108. Id. at 563, 703 S.E.2d at 741.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 563-64,703 S.E.2d at 741.
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concealed weapon112 and "would be necessary and relevant to show
ownership or possession, could serve to rebut any defenses offered by
defendant at trial, and would aid the State in prosecuting the crime to
its full potential.""' Only two weeks later in Mbacke, the court of
appeals insisted that such evidence could only be categorized as
supporting separate offenses or as unrelated to the offense of carrying
a weapon14 and that Gant "require[d] an officer to suspect the
presence of more direct evidence of the crime of arrest than the
highly indirect circumstantial evidence the State contends may be
necessary to rebut possible defenses.""'s Despite the similarities
between the two fact patterns, the court of appeals in Mbacke did not
distinguish or even reference its Foy decision.1 16
One advantage of the court of appeals's decision in Foy is that it
is fairly clear about having interpreted Gant as limiting the scope of
vehicular searches incident to arrest to cases "where evidence of the
crime was reasonably believed to be present based on the nature of
the suspected offense."1 17 The court reasoned that the crime of
carrying a concealed weapon is "more akin to illegal narcotics
possession ... than it is to a simple traffic violation.""' To the Foy
court, it was enough that the defendant was arrested for carrying a
concealed weapon to hold that the search incident to arrest did not
violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
Though the straightforward holding in Foy is attractive, how the
court arrived at its conclusion is problematic. Other than quoting a
short holding from an unreported case,'19 the Foy court said very little
about how it arrived at its interpretation of Gant. Its most forceful
assertion regarding authority for its decision was that its analysis in
112. See id. at 567, 703 S.E.2d at 743. Unlike in the court of appeals's Mbacke decision,
see supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text, the Foy court did not mention the specific
concealed weapon statute under which the defendant was being prosecuted. This arguably
is an erroneous oversight since the Foy court (as in the Gant opinion) appears to take the
NOTO approach, see infra text accompanying notes 117-18, and one cannot understand
the nature of an offense while considering neither its elements nor the statute that
prohibits it.
113. Foy, 208 N.C. App. at 566, 703 S.E.2d at 743.
114. See State v. Mbacke, 209 N.C. App. 35, 44, 703 S.E.2d 823, 829 (2011), rev'd, 365
N.C. 403, 721 S.E.2d 218 (2012).
115. Id. at 43, 703 S.E.2d at 829.
116. See id. at 43-44, 703 S.E.2d at 829.
117. Foy, 208 N.C. App. at 566, 703 S.E.2d at 743.
118. Id.
119. See id. at 565, 703 S.E.2d at 743 (" '[B]ecause Defendant was arrested for carrying
a concealed weapon, the officers reasonably believed that the vehicle contained evidence
concerning the gun and a search of the vehicle was proper.' " (quoting United States v.
Leak, No. 3:09-cr-81-W, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45564, at *14 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 5, 2010))).
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State v. Toledo,120 decided earlier that year, was "controlling and
dispositive of the instant case."121 However, Toledo is notably distinct
from Foy in applying the "reasonable to believe" 2 2 standard in ways
that make the Foy court's unqualified reliance on it somewhat
questionable.
First, the Toledo court made it evident that it was not applying
Gant."' Second, the Foy court's summary of Toledo reveals that the
two cases' facts are fundamentally different. In Toledo, the officer,
after stopping the defendant to issue a citation, obtained the
defendant's consent to search the vehicle. 124 During the consensual
search, the officer detected a strong odor of marijuana coming from a
spare tire inside the car and placed the defendant under arrest for
possession of marijuana.125 After the officer secured the defendant in
the patrol car, "[a] subsequent search incident to arrest uncovered a
substantial amount of marijuana [inside the car's] tire and in another
tire" that was attached to the outside of the vehicle." Unlike in Foy,
where additional evidence sought by the arresting officer would only
have been relevant to prove ownership of the gun or to rebut any
defenses the defendant might offer at trial, the officer in Toledo
searched the arrestee's vehicle to confirm the presence of marijuana
and because the defendant's odd behavior struck the officer as
suspicious.127 Given the weakness of the support in Foy, it is probably
not surprising that the same court ignored the decision two weeks
later in Mbacke. It is telling, however, that two panels of the same
court could reach such opposite conclusions about the meaning of
Gant within such a short space of time.
C. The Problem with Failing to Choose a Rule
If the Supreme Court of North Carolina was unsure exactly how
to apply Gant, they are not entirely blameworthy, given that Gant's
120. 204 N.C. App. 170, 693 S.E.2d 201 (2010).
121. Foy, 208 N.C. App. at 567, 703 S.E.2d at 743.
122. Id. (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009)).
123. See Toledo, 204 N.C. App. at 174, 693 S.E.2d at 203 ("We believe Gant is
instructive but otherwise inapplicable to the facts before us.").
124. See id. at 172, 693 S.E.2d at 202.
125. Id. at 175, 693 S.E.2d at 204.
126. Foy, 208 N.C. App. at 566, 703 S.E.2d at 743 (discussing the Toledo facts).
127. The behavior that contributed to the officer's decision to search the arrestee's car
was the arrestee's extreme nervousness and unsatisfactory answer as to why he would
carry tires that were too large for his vehicle. See Toledo, 204 N.C. App. at 171-72, 693
S.E.2d at 202.
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language is notoriously vague.'28 However, the state court also cannot
be fully exonerated. It was aware of the two approaches available-it
addressed both alternatives in its majority opinion in Mbacke and
pointed to cases that applied eachl2 9-and declined to choose either.
The fact that the court could not confidently uphold the search of Mr.
Mbacke's vehicle under either standard,3 0 instead doing so without
articulating a clear rule, means that lower courts will be left to their
own devices when applying the holding to novel situations. Where
courts are permitted to choose (or invent) their own standard, the
state sinks back toward a pre-Gant regime where exploratory
searches incident to arrest for any given offense might be permitted."3 '
The problems resulting from a lack of clear guidance on how to
apply the Gant test are perhaps even more pronounced for law
enforcement officers, who must inevitably make their judgments
under high-pressure conditions.13 2 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
after all, "is primarily intended to regulate the police in their day-to-
day activities and thus ought to be expressed in terms that are readily
applicable" by officers. Of course, the court cannot be expected to
provide a rule for every situation that might arise.'34 But Gant
jurisprudence is already vague, and North Carolina courts have
contributed to the problem."' What is more, because courts can easily
128. Critics have argued that the United States Supreme Court itself "can be faulted
for leaving the lower courts with virtually no guidance for applying Gant's second
holding." Armacost, supra note 3, at 308.
129. See State v. Mbacke, 365 N.C. 403,407-11, 721 S.E.2d 218,220-23 (2012).
130. See supra Part III.A.
131. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,347 (2009).
132. University of North Carolina School of Government Professor Jeff Welty
remarked in a blog, informally but insightfully, that "[i]f I were a law-enforcement officer,
I'm not sure I would know quite what to make of that, i.e., whether an arrest for a
concealed weapons offense would presumptively give me access to the arrestee's vehicle
or not." Jeff Welty, Coming Mbacke to an Old Topic: Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest,
U.N.C. SCH. GOv'T BLOG (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:22 AM), http://sogweb.sog.unc.edu/
blogs/ncclaw/?p=3309.
133. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-
By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized Procedures": The Robinson Dilemma, 1974
SuP. Cr. REV. 127, 141).
134. See Justin Casson, Comment, Arizona v. Gant: Just Another Speed Bump?, 45
GONZ. L. REV. 797, 816 (2010).
135. Current North Carolina jurisprudence primarily consists of Mbacke along with
court of appeals cases State v. Carter, 200 N.C. App. 47, 682 S.E.2d 416 (2009), and State v.
Foy, 208 N.C. App. 562, 703 S.E.2d 741 (2010). Even if one were to ignore for a moment
all of the other decisions resulting from the Gant case, the two court of appeals cases
mentioned here also resist settling on a single rule. Although the court of appeals in Carter
did not explicitly choose either rule, it seemed to apply elements of the circumstances-of-
each-case standard: "[Ilt would be unreasonable to presume that papers seen on the
passenger seat of the car were related" to the offense of arrest and thus there was no
20131 PROBLEMS WITH STATE V. MBACKE 1423
declare law-enforcement-created procedures unconstitutional, police
departments "are without incentives to employ rulemaking and are
actually discouraged from promulgating regulations.""13  On the
ground level, the consequence is this: unsure of the implications of
the recent changes in Fourth Amendment law, '3 an officer might
elect to forego a search where one standard would have encouraged it
or "may conduct vehicle searches only to have the fruits of those
searches excluded from trial.""' The former could potentially prevent
grievous crimes from ever being uncovered, while the latter could
inhibit prosecution where simply waiting for a warrant would have
made the evidence admissible.1 39
IV. WHAT'S NEXT: RECOMMENDATION FOR A FURTHER
COURSE OF ACTION
While a weighing of the policy issues involved may favor one
approach over another, the most pressing need is for North Carolina
to settle on one standard, since arbitrary, suspicionless searches are
abhorrent to the Fourth Amendment's protections. 140 In other words,
the Supreme Court of North Carolina, the next time it has the chance
to hear a case concerning vehicular searches incident to arrest, should
decide whether the determination of reasonableness of belief should
reason to believe that the vehicle contained evidence pertaining to the offense. Carter, 200
N.C. App. at 53, 682 S.E.2d at 421. Meanwhile, the standard applied by the court of
appeals in Foy more closely resembled the nature-of-the-offense rule: "Unlike driving
without a license and certain other traffic violations, the crime of carrying a concealed
weapon is more akin to illegal narcotics possession, where evidence of the crime of arrest
may be found in the vehicle, than it is to a simple traffic violation." Foy, 208 N.C. App. at
566, 703 S.E.2d. at 743.
136. Casson, supra note 134, at 816-17.
137. An officer could be reasonably unsure whether an offense of arrest presumptively
gives rise to a "reason[] to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest,"
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009), and of his ability to come up with a sufficiently
"articulable basis," State v. Mbacke, 365 N.C. 403, 409, 721 S.E.2d 218, 222 (2012), to
satisfy the court (given that no one knows quite what the court wants). Furthermore,
officers in North Carolina are currently left "without a clear fact pattern for comparison."
Id. at 413,721 S.E.2d at 224 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).
138. Mbacke, 365 N.C. at 413, 721 S.E.2d at 224 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).
139. Of course, where a court explicitly adopted a broad reading of the NOTO rule, an
officer might be free to brazenly search a vehicle based on his naming of the crime as one
that the court had deemed as providing "reasonable belief," even where surrounding
circumstances indicated that no evidence was likely to be found in the vehicle. To reduce
the likelihood of this problem arising, courts should adopt a narrowly defined NOTO
standard, whereby only a small handful of crimes automatically justify a vehicular search.
See infra Part IV.C.
140. See Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of Composition:
Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MiSS. L.J. 341, 420-
21(2004).
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be based on "the offense, by its nature,"141 or "the circumstances of
each case," 42 and it should definitively state that rule. This Recent
Development concludes that a narrowly construed nature-of-the-
offense standard is the most favorable approach.143 Nonetheless, both
standards have merit, and it is important to consider the advantages
and disadvantages of each.
A. The Circumstances-of-Each-Case Approach
One of the first advantages of adopting a circumstances-of-each-
case rule in North Carolina is that the standard would provide
internal consistency with Mbacke's primary holding: that investigators
may conduct a warrantless search when they "have a reasonable and
articulable basis to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest
might be found in a suspect's vehicle after the occupants have been
removed and secured."'" The court openly adopted the "reasonable
and articulable" standard of the landmark case Terry v. Ohio,145
wherein the United States Supreme Court required a case-by-case
Fourth Amendment analysis, naming "reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular government invasion of a citizens'
personal security" as "the central inquiry.""'s Adopting a COEC
approach would allow the "reasonable and articulable basis"
language to maintain a consistent connotation between its source and
Mbacke's adoption of the phrase.'47
Further, law enforcement officers, not judges, have firsthand
experience with criminal behavior and have spent their careers fine-
tuning an intuition of when immediate action is essential; officers see
the arrest scene and witness suspects' behavior directly, rather than
through police reports and other static evidence. A rule relying on the
141. Mbacke, 365 N.C. at 410, 721 S.E.2d at 222.
142. Id. at 411, 721 S.E.2d at 223.
143. An alternative to this conservative NOTO approach might be a COEC rule that
has the offense itself as its most important "circumstance." However, such an approach
would bring with it, to an extent, the same disadvantages which this Recent Development
argues make the COEC rule less desirable. See infra notes 149-58 and accompanying text.
144. Mbacke, 365 N.C. at 409-10, 721 S.E.2d at 222.
145. 392 U.S. 1 (1967). The Supreme Court held in part that "in justifying [a] particular
intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion." Id. at 21.
146. Id. at 19. Indeed, this conclusion by the United States Supreme Court alone serves
as substantial support for a fact-specific approach to Fourth Amendment analysis.
147. Otherwise, if the Supreme Court of North Carolina chose to clearly adopt a
NOTO rule, it would almost certainly need to overrule its central Mbacke holding or risk
confusion over the use of the "reasonable and articulable basis" language.
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circumstances of each case to determine when it is reasonable to
believe that a vehicle contains relevant evidence would allow law
enforcement officials to exercise discretion based on the exact scene
of arrest they encounter, the specific arrestee behavior they witness,
and their knowledge of which crimes are usually corroborated by
evidence in the vehicle "-factors which are inherently less accessible
after the fact.
On the other hand, while support for a COEC standard can be
found elsewhere in the Mbacke opinion, there is no textual
reinforcement for such a rule in Gant itself. 149 Courts settling on a
COEC rule typically do so after enumerating what they consider to
be the practical disadvantages of a more rigid, offense-based rule.1 so
For example, opponents of a nature-of-the-offense rule point out that
the only means of categorizing specific offenses would be a resource-
draining series of individual decisions;"'s however, a fluid,
circumstances-of-each-case rule could lead to as much, if not more,
litigation, with disputes centering around which factors should be
considered and how much weight should be given to each. The
specific "reasonable to believe" construction, after all, is not a
familiar standard or oft-used language in the Fourth Amendment
context.152 As courts decide more Gant-related cases, naming and
interpreting factors and assessing their weight, jurisprudence is bound
to become more complex and detail oriented, and "[a] highly
sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands, and buts
and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline distinctions
... may be 'literally impossible of application by the officer in the
field.' "Is" Furthermore, even after a court has deemed a factor
148. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 18 n.15 ("Focusing the inquiry squarely on the dangers and
demands of the particular situation ... seems more likely to produce rules which are
intelligible to the police .... ").
149. The Court's only reference to the actual circumstances of Gant's arrest in its
reasoning is to explain why safety considerations also did not justify a search. See Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 344 (2009) ("Under those circumstances, Gant clearly was not
within reaching distance of his car at the time of the search.").
150. For example, the Supreme Court of Colorado, after admitting that the examples
provided in Gant "might suggest a pure 'nature-of-the-offense' exception," arrived at its
apparent conclusion that courts should apply a fact-specific standard solely on the basis
that "a non-case-specific test would suffer from objections similar to those that Gant
condemned in the broad reading of Belton." People v. Chamberlain, 229 P.3d 1054, 1056-
57 (Colo. 2010) (en banc). The court then promptly changed subjects without elaboration.
See id. at 1057.
151. See United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724, 732 (E.D. Tenn. 2010).
152. See Welty, supra note 105.
153. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting LaFave, supra note 133, at
141).
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important, evidentiary issues might ultimately prevent the element
from being considered. 5 4 Finally, if after litigating the multiplicity of
factors of an officer's "reason[] to believe," 5 the court disagrees with
the officer's judgment, it might suppress evidence that the officer
could have obtained through a search warrant had he concluded at
the time that one was necessary.' Given that the Court in Gant
declined to overrule Belton,'" it makes little sense to "reintroduce[]
the same sort of case-by-case, fact-specific decisionmaking that the
Belton rule was adopted to avoid."' 8
B. The Nature-of-the-Offense Approach
The first advantage of relying on the nature of the offense to
guide vehicular searches is that such a rule is more closely supported
by the actual language and analysis in Gant. Although the Supreme
Court's elaboration on its new, second prong is scant, what little
explanation it does provide is this:
In many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a
traffic violation, there will be no reasonable basis to believe the
vehicle contains relevant evidence. But in others, including
Belton and Thornton, the offense of arrest will supply a basis for
searching the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle
and any containers therein.'
Likewise, in Justice Scalia's Thornton concurrence, from which
the Gant Court adopted its otherwise unprecedented second prong, 160
154. For example, in United States v. Taylor, 49 A.3d 818 (D.C. 2012), the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals declined to seriously consider the officer's experience as part
of the totality of-the circumstances because the court knew " 'too little about [the officer's]
experience' to place much weight upon his conclusory statement that 'typically someone
who is driving under the influence also has an open container of alcohol or multiple
containers of alcohol in their vehicle.' " Id. at 827 (citation omitted). The court explained
that "[w]ithout a great deal more detail, we have no basis for determining whether such
behavior is indeed 'typical' of someone driving under the influence." Id. Such a problem
with the record is unlikely to arise under a NOTO analysis, where the only relevant fact is
the offense of arrest.
155. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
156. See Welty, supra note 105.
157. See Gant, 556 U.S. at 335 ("The safety and evidentiary justifications underlying
Chimel's reaching-distance rule determine Belton's scope.").
158. Id. at 360 (Alito, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 343-44 (majority opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
160. See id. at 332-33 ("Although it does not follow from Chimel, circumstances unique
to the automobile context also justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is
'reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle.'" (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
concurring))).
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the Justice observed that the "petitioner was lawfully arrested for a
drug offense" and then immediately concluded that "[ilt was
reasonable for [the officer] to believe that further contraband or
similar evidence relevant to the crime for which he had been arrested
might be found in the vehicle,"'"' as if no further information was
needed. Elsewhere in his concurrence, the Justice also twice quoted a
line from a treatise on criminal procedure that "[tjhe officer who
arrests a man on a criminal charge should consider the nature of the
charge" before searching;16 2 Justice Scalia never proposed that any
other circumstance should be considered.
A nature-of-the-offense rule also has the potential to provide a
simpler standard. It is important to remember that Fourth
Amendment rules are, above all, meant to guide police officers in a
hectic line of work while protecting the public's right to privacy; thus
a simple, easy-to-apply guideline is ideal. Although police may be
accustomed to "[f]ocusing the inquiry squarely on the dangers and
demands of the particular situation,""6 it is difficult to predict when a
court will agree with an officer's judgment, posing the risk that a
court will suppress evidence that an officer would have otherwise
obtained through a warrant. A short, pre-determined list of
offenses'" for which a search incident to arrest is justified would
provide an officer a quick reference and much more certainty on how
to proceed than would a multi-factor test whereby an officer must
gamble on his chance of later receiving the court's ratification.
The final advantage of a nature-of-the-offense rule is that it
provides courts with the opportunity to construe the Gant standard
more narrowly: that is, by allowing the approach to be used only in a
small subset of cases, primarily those specifically delineated in Gant
itself.16 5 A narrow reading is preferable in this context for two
161. Thornton, 542 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring).
162. Id. at 630, 632 (quoting 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; OR, PLEADING, EVIDENCE, AND PRACTICE IN CRIMINAL
CASES 127 (2d ed. 1872)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 n.15 (1967).
164. The list certainly should be short. See infra Part IV.C.
165. The narrower reading encouraged here is to be contrasted with a broader
interpretation of the NOTO rule, which would allow courts to classify each offense
individually as either one that is, "by its nature, ... a crime that might yield physical
evidence," or one that is not. Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671, 681 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
The problems with this approach were articulated by the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Tennessee in United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724 (E.D.
Tenn. 2010). First, an attempt to categorize all criminal offenses into one group or the
other would run into interpretive problems where the probability of physical evidence for
a particular offense is less clear-cut than in the cases of traffic violations. See id. at 732.
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significant reasons. First, the United States Supreme Court has
insisted that "police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant
procedure." 66 In the specific context to which the Gant rule applies,
arrestees have already been handcuffed and placed in the back of a
squad vehicle; thus, the urgency of "protecting arresting officers and
safeguarding any evidence ... that an arrestee might conceal or
destroy" 67 is no longer present to justify bypassing the warrant
requirement. A limited reading of the Gant "reasonable to believe"
exception, then, will decrease the likelihood of an officer performing
a warrantless search which the judicial system later determines to be
in violation of the arrestee's Fourth Amendment rights. Second, the
narrow interpretation afforded by a conservative nature-of-the-
offense standard is preferable because of the lack of guidance on how
to apply this new Gant prong.' Such an interpretation of the rule
would save lower courts from having to constantly extrapolate Gant's
reasoning to warrantless vehicular searches where the offenses were
neither substance possessions nor traffic violations, at least until the
Supreme Court gets a chance to revisit its decision.
There are, of course, also valid concerns that have prompted
many courts around the country to shy away from the nature-of-the-
offense interpretation. In Reagan, for example, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee laid out a clear
list of reasons why it considered the NOTO standard to be inferior. 69
First, it explained, "[r]easonable people could disagree about exactly
Second, the only way to classify offenses would be a series of court decisions in each
jurisdiction. See id. This could lead to uncertainty among law enforcement officers (where
an offense has not been categorized yet) and inconsistencies between jurisdictions,
especially since the elements and definitions of criminal offenses often vary between
jurisdictions. See id. For more on the Reagan case, see infra text accompanying notes 169-
74.
166. Terry, 392 U.S. at 20.
167. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (2009). These traditionally were the grounds
for a search incident to arrest. See id.
168. The full extent of the explanation the Court gives of "when it is reasonable to
believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle" is that a
search will presumably be allowed where the defendant was arrested for drug possession,
but not where the offense of arrest was a traffic violation. See id. at 343. Furthermore, the
new "reasonable to believe" prong has no substantial pedigree that lower courts can use to
discern more particularly what the Supreme Court had in mind; rather, the Court admitted
that its new standard "does not follow from Chimel" and instead cited only Scalia's
concurrence from Thornton. Id.
169. See Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d at 732. In this case, the court was responding directly
to Brown v. State, which concluded that theft was among those criminal offenses that by
their nature might yield physical evidence. Id. at 731 (citing Brown, 24 So. 3d at 677).
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what can be considered 'physical evidence,' and about whether there
'might' be any physical evidence," causing problems when it came to
categorizing each individual offense as either one where a vehicular
search was likely to yield relevant evidence or one where it was not. 170
As a result, even once a classification had been made, it could be
uncertain and subject to reversal in a later case if it produced
"unreasonable or unintended results."171 Second, the district court
said, "even if it were possible to simply classify criminal offenses using
[such a] dichotomy, the only method for determining which offenses
fit in each class would be a series of decisions rendered by various
courts throughout the country," which would lead to inconsistency
between jurisdictions." Third, and most significant according to the
Reagan court, a nature-of-the-offense "rule could actually allow
police to search a vehicle passenger compartment incident to an
arrest when it is wholly unreasonable to believe that evidence of the
offense of arrest is inside, but the nature of the offense per se makes a
search permissible." 7 3
Though the Reagan court's NOTO rule concerns are valid, many
can be countered or diminished by narrowly interpreting the rule-in
other words, by approving a search incident to arrest only for those
offenses which the Gant opinion makes absolutely clear should justify
one. Under such a rule, little to no additional litigation is needed to
classify each individual crime (or to name and weigh important
"circumstances") and disparate categorizations in different
jurisdictions would be similarly scarce. A short list of offenses would
serve well as a simple standard that "is essential to guide police
officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect on and
balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific
circumstances they confront."' 4
170. Id. at 732.
171. Id.
172, Id.
173. Id. For example, a state might conclude that where the defendant is arrested for
driving under the influence of alcohol, it is almost always reasonable to allow officers to
search the vehicle for open containers. However, in a situation in which an officer watched
a bar patron stagger to her car empty-handed, it would arguably not be reasonable to
believe that the patron's vehicle contained open containers. See id. at 732-33. Nonetheless,
a per se rule would allow police to search the vehicle even in the latter situation.
174. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981) (quoting Dunaway v. New York,
442 U.S. 200, 213-14 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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C. The Proposed Rule
So which offenses should be included in the nature of the offense
rule? Even to say "very few" is somewhat misleading. In reality, Gant
only explicitly provides for one offense where it is "reasonable to
believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest"": drug
possession.' 6 It is important to note that this category should not be
generalized as "drug offenses," because it does not include selling
drugs, even though penalties for such offenses (as with possession)
often vary depending on the amount of substance sold.' The
reasoning for this distinction is because possession is an offense for
which arrest usually occurs simultaneously with police's discovery of
the offense." By contrast, arrests for drug sales and trafficking often
occur after an extended investigation." 9
Although this Recent Development generally encourages courts
not to venture further than what can be explicitly located in the text
175. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
176. The Court presented drug possession as an example but gave no indication of
precisely what characteristics qualified the offense as making it "reasonable to believe the
vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." Id. Thus, while lower courts may be
tempted to extend the holding to other offenses by analogy, such reasoning has lead to
widely divergent results. See supra Part I.
177. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95(h) (2011). The Supreme Court in Gant did not
explain why it believed drug possession was an offense for which it was reasonable to
believe that evidence might be found in the vehicle. One possibility is that the severity of
punishment for possession offenses varies depending on the amount of contraband
possessed. See, e.g., id. Thus, in order to determine exactly what crime with which the
arrestee is to be charged, it might be reasonable for an officer to search the vehicle to see
how much controlled substance the arrestee actually possessed, or to confirm the presence
of the drug if the officer made the arrest based on an odor emanating from the vehicle.
178. Cf State v. McCullough, 76 So. 3d 399, 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011). In
McCullough, the defendant was arrested four to five months after a warrant was issued for
an alleged sale of cocaine. Id. The court objected that if all drug offenses were held to
automatically authorize a search incident to arrest, "then an arrest warrant for a single sale
of perishable contraband would authorize a search of the arrestee's vehicle at any time,
whether days, months, or even years later, despite the fact that it may not be reasonable to
believe any evidence of the original illegal act remained." Id.
It should be noted that it is conceivable that an arrest warrant could be issued
following a reliable tip that the defendant possessed an illegal substance and could lead to
the same unfortunate result. However, the text of Gant quite clearly suggests that
possession of illicit substances is by its nature a crime for which it is reasonable to believe
evidence might be found in the vehicle. If what appears to be the Supreme Court's clear
holding leads unintentionally to an unfortunate result such as this, it will be the onus of the
Court to clarify its rule.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012) (describing a prolonged
investigation of a suspected drug trafficker which included twenty-eight days of vehicle
tracking aided by GPS). For a discussion of offenses for which investigations may be
lengthy and arrests may be made under a warrant, see infra text accompanying notes 197-
201201.
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of Gant, courts may want to consider including one other category of
offenses in their list: those whose statutory elements require that
surrounding circumstances be taken into account. It is here-and only
here-that a judge might find exceptions for specific weapons
offenses, similar to (but not including) the one for which the Mbacke
defendant was arrested. For example, in United States v. Vinton, 80 the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit analyzed whether
a search incident to the defendant's arrest for "carrying a dangerous
weapon""' was appropriate by examining the statute that prohibited
it.' 2 District of Columbia courts had previously determined that a
"deadly or dangerous weapon" covered by the statute included one
"that ostensibly may be used as a tool in certain trades or hobbies or
. . . may be carried for utilitarian reasons, but where the surrounding
circumstances indicate that the purpose of carrying the object" is to
use it as a weapon.18 3 If an officer has judged that the "surrounding
circumstances" justify an arrest for such an offense, it might be
reasonable for him to believe that further evidence corroborating that
judgment will be found in the vehicle.'" Likewise, had the statute at
issue in Mbacke required that the defendant actually own the
concealed weapon rather than simply possess it, then a vehicular
search might be justified to confirm the defendant's ownership of the
weapon (through evidence such as receipts or a gun permit). 8s The
180. 594 F.3d 14 (D.C. Cir. 2010). In this case, the officer pulled the defendant over for
speeding. Id. at 18. Upon stopping the defendant, the officer also noticed that the windows
of the vehicle were excessively tinted and that the car displayed a marking suggesting
affiliation with law enforcement. Id. The officer also spotted, within plain view and within
reaching distance of the defendant, a large knife. Id. Because there had been a double-
stabbing homicide in the area about a day before, the officer decided to handcuff Vinton
(without arresting him) and conduct a protective search of the vehicle. Id. at 18-19.
Finding mace, another knife, earplugs, and a locked briefcase, the officer proceeded with
the arrest for "possession of a prohibited weapon." Id. at 19.
181. Id. at 22.
182. See D.C. CODE § 22-4504(a) (Supp. 2012), amended by Firearms Amendment Act
of 2012, sec. 3(d), 59 D.C. Reg. 5691, 5697 (May 15, 2012); see also Vinton, 594 F.3d at 22
(citing D.C. Circuit cases that have used the same approach).
183. Vinton, 594 F.3d at 22 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
184. For example, if a defendant's behavior aroused an officer's suspicion regarding
claims of an innocent purpose for possessing the weapon and the defendant had been
stopped near an area which was known as a hub for drug dealing, it might be reasonable
for the officer to believe that a search of the defendant's vehicle would reveal narcotics,
thus providing additional evidence that the defendant possessed the weapon for the
purposes of carrying out an illegal transaction.
185. The North Carolina Court of Appeals rejected the state's contention that such
evidence would be relevant, see State v. Mbacke, 209 N.C. App. 35, 43, 703 S.E.2d 823, 829
(2011), rev'd, 365 N.C. 403, 721 S.E.2d 218 (2012), given that the statute at issue did not
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list of statutory provisions triggering this exception, then, might
include requirements of ownership, use of an article, or the condition
that the suspect exhibit a particular mental state.186 Of course, a court
may reasonably opt to omit this category of crimes from those per se
conferring police authority to perform a Gant search, given that such
a categorization finds no textual support in Gant.8 1 Still, the
exception may be wise on a policy level, allowing officers to quickly
confirm that they did in fact have probable cause to search a
defendant for a particular crime. If a court does choose to adopt
crimes from this category into its list of reasonable-to-believe
offenses, it must exercise its most cautious judgment.188
As a corollary, this Recent Development also presents a list of
offense categories that should not be included in North Carolina's, or
any state's, list of offenses that per se give rise to a reason to believe
that a vehicular search is justified under Gant. First, the enumeration
should not include traffic offenses, as these, after all, encompass the
crime for which defendant Gant was arrested and are specifically
mentioned by the Supreme Court as offenses for which there is "no
reasonable basis to believe the vehicle contains relevant evidence." 89
Second, the list"'e should not include offenses based solely on
officers' and prosecutors' arguments that the original evidence that
was sufficient to establish "probable cause" for arrest might be
suppressed at trial, thereby necessitating a search for backup evidence
require demonstration of the defendant's ownership of the weapon. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-269(al) (2011).
186. For example, a statute might require that an individual know that he was carrying
a weapon. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 269, § 10(a) (LexisNexis 2010) (seeking to
punish anyone who, "except as provided or exempted by statute, knowingly has in his
possession; or knowingly has under his control in a vehicle; a firearm").
187. The court might further argue that arresting an individual for a particular crime
implies that the officer already had probable cause to believe that the individual had
committed that crime, and any additional evidence may be obtained through a search
warrant or through a different exception to the warrant requirement.
188. Such cautious judgment would certainly necessitate limiting searches to situations
where it is "reasonable [for officers] to believe" that evidence specifically corroborating
the relevant statutory elements will be found. It may also require the court to foreclose
Gant searches for this category of crimes altogether if, for example, it suspects officers of
"stacking charges" in order to gain access to a vehicle under this slight expansion of the
rule. See LARRY K. GAINES & VICrOR E. KAPPELER, POLICING IN AMERICA 368-69 (7th
ed. 2011) (explaining the police practice of "stacking charges").
189. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009).
190. As suggested above, see supra notes 175-88 and accompanying text, this Recent
Development does not seek to establish a final and unchangeable list of offenses that
should serve as bases for Gant searches. Rather, it means to provide guidance to the
Supreme Court of North Carolina or the North Carolina General Assembly in
constructing such a list.
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of the offense. This justification was raised (and accepted), for
example, in State v. Cantrell,"' a case decided by the Supreme Court
of Idaho. The court affirmed the per se validity of a search incident to
an arrest for Driving Under the Influence ("DUI"),'" reasoning that
a breathalyzer report used to establish probable cause by itself may
be suppressed during trial."3 The same analysis, if accepted, would
justify concluding that a search incident to an arrest for DUI was
valid per se in North Carolina as well, where the statute governing
impaired driving does not "preclude a person from asserting that a
chemical analysis result is inadmissible pursuant to G.S.
20-139.1(b2)." 9 But whether backup evidence might be needed for
prosecution is not the question under Gant. The second prong of
Gant instructs the court to ask instead whether it is "reasonable to
believe" that evidence of the crime of arrest might be found in the
vehicle. 95 As the Reagan court pointed out, a per se rule allowing
officers to search a vehicle whose occupant has been arrested for
driving while intoxicated could validate a search where there was in
fact no reason to think that an open container would be found in the
car.196 Where a breathalyzer test has given an officer probable cause
to arrest a defendant, the possibility that this evidence might be
suppressed is not grounds to permit an exploratory search of the
vehicle, since such reasoning would permit searches for a virtually
limitless number of offenses.
The second prong of the Gant test should also not be held to
allow searches incident to arrest for two other types of offenses. The
first of those is theft, where arrests are often made under arrest
warrants and thus can occur long after the theft was committed. "For
arrests based on outstanding arrest warrants, it is highly unlikely" that
it would be reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime
of arrest would be found in the vehicle.197 Exceptions to this
191. 233 P.3d 178 (Idaho 2010).
192. See id. at 185-86.
193. See id. at 185.
194. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-138.1(bl) (2011). Subsection 20-139.1(b2)(2) of the General
Statutes of North Carolina provides that the results of a breathalyzer tests are inadmissible
as evidence if the defendant can demonstrate that maintenance procedures had not been
performed on the breathalyzer instrument as required by the Department of Health and
Human Services within the time limits prescribed by that department's regulations. Id.
§ 20-139.1(b2)(2).
195. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
196. See supra note 173.
197. ROBERT L. FARB, UNIV. OF N.C. SCH. OF GOV'T, THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT'S RULING IN ARIZONA v. GANT 3 (2009), http://www.sog.unc.edulsites/
www.sog.unc.edu/files/arizonagantbyfarb.pdf.
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generalization may exist, of course, where either incriminating facts
regarding the offense charged in the warrant are found at the scene of
arrest or the nature of the offense would suggest that evidence is still
likely to be found in the vehicle.1 8 But even where the exception is
based on the nature of the crime, the actual likelihood of evidence
being found in the vehicle will be affected by the amount of time that
has passed between the issuance of the warrant and the actual arrest.
If an offense for which arrests are commonly made following issuance
of an arrest warrant is held to per se provide a "reason[] to believe"
that evidence will be found, "then an arrest warrant for a single
[offense] would authorize a search of the arrestee's vehicle at any
time, whether days, months, or even years later," even though it
might no longer be reasonable to believe that any evidence remained
therein.1 99 To avoid potentially allowing police to search a vehicle in a
situation where "it is wholly unreasonable to believe that evidence of
the offense of arrest is inside," but where the offense has nonetheless
been deemed to permit a search,20 theft and other crimes wherein
arrests are frequently made under warrants should not be held to per
se permit a search incident to arrest. 201
The other type of offense which should not confer authority to
conduct a search incident to arrest is possession of a weapon, except
to the extent that the court decides to allow searches incident to
arrest for crimes where a statutory element requires that surrounding
circumstances be taken into account. 2" Significantly, however, any
possible exceptions should not be read to include the offense of
"carrying a concealed weapon" for which Mbacke was arrested, since
neither ownership, use, nor a mental state (such as knowledge of
possession) is necessary, and any additional evidence found in the
198. Id.
199. State v. McCullough, 76 So. 3d 399,400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
200. United States v. Reagan, 713 F. Supp. 2d 724,732 (E.D. Tenn. 2010).
201. A court could perhaps create a rule that such an offense could be held to per se
allow a search unless the arrest was made after a prolonged investigation and under a
warrant. However, there is no textual basis for such an exception in Gant, and this Recent
Development encourages extremely careful enumeration of the offenses that provide
reasonable belief by their nature that a search is appropriate. While it might seem harsh to
deny a search incident to arrest to an officer who has apprehended a suspect within a short
period after the alleged offense, it should be remembered that other exceptions to the
warrant requirement may still allow for a search. See infra notes 205-06 and accompanying
text.
202. See supra notes 180-88 and accompanying text.
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vehicle would be either evidence of separate offenses or evidence
unrelated to the offense of arrest. 2 03
Those who oppose a nature-of-the-offense standard might argue
that moving to such a strict rule would reduce the circumstances
under which police can perform a search incident to arrest by such a
drastic extent as to make their jobs impossibly inefficient.20 Yet there
are several other exceptions that would allow police to search a
vehicle even where Gant would not allow it.20 5 In North Carolina,
justifications for a warrantless search of a vehicle include: where the
officer has probable cause (the automobile exception); where
evidence is in plain view inside the vehicle; where police conduct an
inventory search of a vehicle impounded for safekeeping; where the
vehicle itself is evidence of a crime; and where a vehicle has been
seized because it is subject to forfeiture.20 6 Limiting the scope of Gant
searches would therefore prevent North Carolina from condoning the
sort of exploratory searches condemned by the United States
Supreme Court without completely barring officers from performing
the vehicular searches that are necessary to carry out their role as law
enforcement.
CONCLUSION
Gant has left lower courts with a "mass of contradictions and
obscurities"20 7 in the area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.2 08
Many state and federal courts have attempted to clarify the case by
holding either "that the 'nature of the charge' is determinative of
whether there exists a reasonable basis to search for evidence"'209 or
203. See State v. Mbacke, 209 N.C. App. 35, 44-45, 703 S.E.2d 823, 829-30 (2011),
rev'd, 365 N.C. 403, 721 S.E.2d 218 (2012).
204. Cf Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 358-59 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing the fact that law enforcement officers had relied on their ability to conduct
Belton searches for twenty-eight years as one of the principle reasons to uphold the rule).
205. For example, in United States v. Brunick, 374 F. App'x 714 (9th Cir. 2010), the
court held that although the search incident to the driver's arrest for driving without a
license was not permitted under the Gant standard, it was valid as an inventory search
under the officers' impoundment of the vehicle. See id at 715.
206. See ROBERT L. FARB, ARREST, SEARCH, AND INVESTIGATION IN NORTH
CAROLINA 211 (4th ed. 2011). Note that the scope of the search may vary depending on
the particular justification. See id.
207. Casson, supra note 134, at 816 (quoting Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the
Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468 (1985)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
208. The second part of the new rule creates especially "serious problems," since
"[w]hat this rule permits in a variety of situations is entirely unclear." Gant, 556 U.S. at
360-61 (Alito, J., dissenting).
209. Brown v. State, 24 So. 3d 671, 678 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
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that reasonableness of belief should be determined "based upon
common sense factors and the totality of the circumstances."2 10 In
State v. Mbacke, the Supreme Court of North Carolina did not apply
either approach-indeed, if it had chosen to follow either, it would
likely have had to affirm the court of appeals's conclusion that the
post-arrest search of Mbacke's vehicle was unreasonable2 11 and
suppress the nearly one-kilogram brick of powdered cocaine found in
his Ford Escape.2 12
By avoiding a definitive position on Gant's second prong, the
Supreme Court of North Carolina risks nullifying the United States
Supreme Court's effort to remedy what it considered a serious
violation of Fourth Amendment privacy interests.213 There are well-
reasoned arguments in favor of each standard, and in the end, a
choice to definitively adopt either standard would put North Carolina
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in a better state than it is post-
Mbacke. Nonetheless, in order to encourage officers to seek a search
warrant, establish a simple rule that police can apply quickly, and
avoid the mass confusion of courts each adopting their own variation
of the rule, courts should opt for a narrowly constructed nature-of-
the-offense standard.
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